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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Brummett has set out how the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the court erred in dismissing without proper 
notice, erred in concluding that the community caretaker function exception to the Fourth 
Amendment applied in this case, and erred in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of counsel in not filing a motion to 
suppress. Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 7-12. 
The state has responded by arguing that the court provided proper notice of its intention 
to dismiss, Respondent's Brief pp. 7-8, and that the court did not err in summarily dismissing the 
petition because Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Brummett and probable 
cause to arrest him. The state argues that Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause to believe that Mr. Brummett had committed the crimes of trespass and resisting and 
obstructing. Respondent's Brief pp. 9-15. The state also argues that the validity of the search 
was not argued below and should not be considered on appeal. Respondent's Brief pp. 16-17. In 
making its argument, the state notes that it will submit the community care taking question on the 
record below. Respondent's Brief p. 16, ftnt. 3. 
Mr. Brummett should prevail in this appeal, despite the state's argument to the contrary, 
because the notice was deficient, the community caretaker analysis is inapplicable and he did 
raise a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether 
counsel was ineffective in failing to file a suppression motion given that the arrest and search of 
Mr. Brummett violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,§ 
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17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
B. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing the Petition Without 
Proper Notice 
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Brummett's petition on two grounds: 1) that 
the officer was acting within his community caretaker function and 2) "the arresting officer had a 
reasonable suspicion that petitioner was committing criminal activity, particularly when the 
defendant ran from police." R Vol. II, p. 288. 
With regard to the community caretaker function analysis, neither the state nor the court 
had ever mentioned the analysis prior to dismissal. The state's only filing in this case was its 
Answer, which does not mention a community caretaker justification for the arrest and search. R 
Vol. I, pp. 70-73. And, the court did not mention the analysis in its order of conditional 
dismissal. R Vol. II, p. 265-273. Dismissal on this basis was without notice and improper. LC. 
§ 19-4906(b); Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925, 930 (2009). 
With regard to the justification of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, again the 
state made no mention of this in its Answer. R Vol. I, pp. 70-73. The district court's order of 
conditional dismissal likewise does not mention that the arrest and search were justified by 
reasonable suspicion. The closest the court comes to this analysis are these two sentences: 
"Counsel wrote to Petitioner and explained that a Motion to Suppress evidence of his arrest was 
not warranted because Petitioner ran from police after he was told to stop walking on the 
railroad. Counsel provided appropriate case law outlining this conclusion." R Vol. II, p. 271. 
The court then avoids an analysis of reasonable suspicion by noting that Mr. Brummett had pled 
guilty. The court wrote: "Importantly, Petitioner was informed by the Court of his rights at this 
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change of plea; therefore, even if the Court found Petitioner's counsel's performance deficient, 
Petitioner would need to establish prejudice." R Vol. II, p. 272. The court then concluded that 
given the evidence against Mr. Brummett, the court could not find that the result of the 
sentencing hearing would have been different and therefore Mr. Brummett had not established 
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). R Vol. II, p. 
272. 
Mr. Brummett submits that this was not notice as required by LC. § 19-4906(b) that the 
district court intended to summarily dismiss his petition on the grounds that the arresting officer 
had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. R Vol. II, p. 288. 
Because the notice of intent to summarily dismiss was inadequate, Mr. Brummett asks 
that the order of summary dismissal be reversed. 
C. The District Court Erred in Concluding That the Community Caretaker 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment Applied in This Case 
Mr. Brummett relies upon his Opening Brief pp. 8-11 to establish that the district court 
erred in concluding that the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment justified 
the arrest and search in this case. 
D. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Mr. Brummett Did Not 
Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
in Failing to File a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of the 
Federal and State Constitutions. 
The district court held the following: 
At the preliminary hearing, the arresting officer testified that he observed 
petitioner walking on railroad tracks while wearing headphones. He stated that 
the railroad tracks were surrounded by a barbed wire fence and he believed that 
the petitioner was trespassing and that he needed to get off of the railroad tracks. 
The arresting officer testified that he tried to get petitioner's attention multiple 
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times and finally, after yelling as loud as he could, petitioner noticed him. The 
officer told petitioner to get off of the railroad tracks because he believed that 
petitioner was trespassing. After a brief discussion, petitioner ran from the police. 
Shortly after, petitioner was apprehended and officers conducted a search incident 
to arrest and found petitioner in possession of methamphetamine. 
Based on these facts, this Court finds that the arresting officer had a reasonable 
suspicion that petitioner was committing criminal activity, particularly when the 
defendant ran from police. 
R Vol. II, p. 287-288. 
Mr. Brummett has argued that the district court erred insofar as it concluded that by 
running, Mr. Brummett gave the police a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his 
detention. Opening Brief pp. 11-12. In reply, the state has argued that Mr. Brummett was not 
seized until Officer Davis tackled him, and, at that point, Officer Davis had "reasonable 
suspicion to stop Brummett and reasonable cause to arrest him." Respondent's Brief pp. 10-11. 
The state goes on to argue that Officer Davis had "reasonable suspicion and probable cause" to 
believe that Mr. Brummett had committed the crimes of trespass and resisting and obstructing. 
Respondent's Brief p. 12. 
The state cites LC. § 18-7008(9) (2008) to support its argument. That section states that a 
person trespasses when the person enters real property of another without permission and the 
property is marked in specific ways, including containing certain signs and fencing materials. 
The state argues that Officer Davis knew that the railroad area was marked with a sign and 
protected by a fence. The state also appears to assert that Mr. Brummett's running from Officer 
Davis provided reasonable suspicion for a trespass stop. Respondent's Brief pp. 12-13. The 
state supports this analysis by quoting Officer Davis' testimony that he had seen a single no 
trespassing sign and that there was a chain link fence and barbed wire. Respondent's Brief p. 12. 
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The statute the state cites requires no trespassing signs or other specified notifications 
every 660 feet except when the geographical configuration of the property is such that entry can 
reasonably be made only at certain points. In that case, the property is posted sufficiently if the 
signs or other notices are posted at the points of access. LC. § 18-7008(9)(2008), quoted at 
Respondent's Brief p. 13. 
Officer Davis never testified that the single sign he saw was at the single point of access 
to the property. In fact, from the record, it appears that there were multiple means of access and 
that the tracks were not fenced completely in. Officer Davis wrote in his police report: 
I began to scale the fence near the 11 th Ave overpass onto the Union Pacific rail 
road property. As I climbed the fence, I observed the male take off running 
northbound from his location on the rail road tracks. A train was moving at a 
slow pace and David climbed through the middle of two railroad cars. The train 
stopped in time for me to climb through the same location of the two railroad cars. 
I pursued David northbound towards 12th Ave 1st N. I observed David trip over a 
curb as he reached the northwest corner of 12th Ave N and 1st St N. David stood 
up and faced me as I was running towards him. I advised him to get on the 
ground. David did not get on the ground. I advised him to get on the ground 
again and he failed to do so. I tackled David to the ground and put him in 
handcuffs. David advised me that he was not a bad person and that he did not 
want to get into trouble. 
R Vol. I, p. 27. 
This narrative does not mention Mr. Brummett or Officer Davis climbing a fence to leave 
the tracks and get to the curb at the corner or 12th Ave. N and 1 St. N. Given the signage and 
fencing requirements of the statute and this narrative, Officer Davis did not have reasonable 
suspicion, let alone probable cause to believe that Mr. Brummett was trespassing. 
Moreover, Mr. Brummett fleeing does not create reasonable suspicion of trespass or other 
criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and Illinois v. Wardlow, 
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528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), requiring a totality of the circumstances analysis when 
considering whether reasonable suspicion existed with flight but one circumstance, not a 
definitive circumstance by itself, which is considered in the totality of the circumstances. 
Officer Davis did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of trespass because 
there was no evidence that the railroad property was signed and/or fenced as required to establish 
trespass. He did not articulate any other crime of which he was suspicious. And, while Mr. 
Brummett "fled" he did not begin to run until Officer Davis began to scale the fence to come get 
him. Declining to talk to the police and walking away when no crime has been committed is not 
indicative of criminal activity. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983), 
holding that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an 
individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his/her business. And, 
provoked flight, as occurred here, is considered differently from unprovoked flight. Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 676. 
The state argues that Officer Davis had reasonable and articulable suspicion and probable 
cause to arrest for resisting and obstructing. Respondent's Brief pp. 15-16. However, the 
resisting and obstructing statute requires that the officer be acting within the duty of his/her 
office. I. C. § 18-705. The word "duty" in the statute encompasses only lawful and authorized 
acts of a public officer. State v. Gamma, 143 Idaho 751, 754, 152 P.3d 622,625 (Ct. App. 2006), 
citing State v. Holton, 136 Idaho 499,502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Ct. App. 2001); and State v. 
Wilkerson, 144 Idaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d 471,477 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, for example, in 
Wilkerson, a new trial was required when the jury was not instructed that if the officer was not in 
compliance with the law when he ordered a vehicle towed then the defendant could not be guilty 
6 
of resisting and obstructing when she obstructed the tow truck driver from removing the vehicle. 
In this case, Officer Davis could speak to Mr. Brummett just as he can speak to any 
person he encounters. However, given that Mr. Brummett was not committing any crime and 
that Officer Davis did not have reasonable cause to believe he was committing any crime, Mr. 
Brummett was free to walk away from the encounter. Florida v. Royer, supra. See also, State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), rejecting the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule under Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 17. Mr. Brummett exercised his right to walk 
away and then when he saw Officer Davis climbing a fence and running toward him, he too 
began to run. This was not unprovoked flight, but rather provoked flight. Officer Davis was no 
longer acting within the scope of his duty when he chased down and tackled Mr. Brummett 
without reasonable suspicion of trespass. Thus, Officer Davis likewise lacked reasonable 
suspicion of resisting and obstructing. Consequently, the seizure of Mr. Brummett violated the 
Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Art. I,§ 17. The fruits of that violation are not 
admissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); State v. Guzman, 
supra. 
Mr. Brummett submits that the entire tackling and subsequent search were 
unconstitutional as set out above. In his Opening Brief, he also noted that even if the tackling 
could be justified as a Terry stop, the scope of a Terry stop is limited to a pat-down for weapons, 
not a search for drugs. Appellant's Opening Brief p. 12. The state has responded by arguing that 
the legality of the search was not raised below. Respondent's Brief p. 16. However, Mr. 
Brummett clearly raised the claim of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to move to 
suppress the evidence seized in the search and the district court clearly ruled upon the claim. 
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Given the constitutionality of the search was integral to the claim before the court, the argument 
that it was not raised below should be rejected. 
As an alternative, the state argues that the search was constitutional as it was a search 
subsequent to an arrest for resisting and obstructing. Respondent's Brief, pp. 16-17. However, 
as set out above, there was no valid arrest for resisting and obstructing. Therefore, the search 
cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest. 
Mr. Brummett did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. The district court erred in summarily dismissing the case. Two 
possible remedies are open to this Court. This Court could vacate the order of summary 
dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. Brummett to bring forth further 
evidence to establish that counsel was ineffective. See Padilla v. State, _ Idaho _, _ P .3d 
_, 2014 WL 7263699 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied, vacating an order denying post-conviction 
relief following an evidentiary hearing and remanding for factual findings and conclusions of law 
on the question of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. On the 
other hand, this Court could rule that the district court simply erred in concluding that the search 
was in accord with the federal and state constitutions and that counsel was thus ineffective in 
failing to file a motion to suppress, and thus vacate the order of dismissal and grant relief itself. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brummett respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order of summary dismissal 
based on either or both the lack of proper notice and the presence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. He further requests that this Court either grant post-conviction relief itself or remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
17! 
Respectfully submitted thisL day of May, 2015. 
~ tJl_ ~ ( 
Deborah Whipple ~
Attorney for David Brummett 
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